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Abstract
A denial-of-service attack is an attempt by a single person or a group of people
to disrupt an online service. The cost of the attack depends on the importance
of the online service in the Internet world, whether it is online banking or online
shopping. Shutting down some services for some hours can cost millions and millions
of dollars for companies like Amazon, eBay, HSBC, etc. So a denial-of-service
attack is a very serious problem in the online world. By recognizing such an attack
at the beginning can reduce the damage caused by these attacks. Even so, such
an attempt is extremely difficult on the networks where the traffic is very high.
Furthermore, people who were determined to take down a particular network service
will definitely do a lot of homework and can cause much more damage than a general
denial-of-service attack can.
However, there are a lot of mechanisms available today to identify the
denial-of-service attacks. One such method is entropy based detection scheme. In
entropy based detection scheme, packet size entropy based scheme is much faster
and easy to implement. Even so, there are some shortcomings as well to this
method. This thesis introduces a new parameter to the packet size entropy based
DoS attack detection scheme so that it can improve the detection accuracy. The
new parameter is the entropy of the source and destination IP address combination.
I.e. a concatenation of both addresses will give a hash like value, which can uniquely
identify a particular path. By this parameter, even if the attacker changes the packet
size using simple application programs for packets such as ICMP, the attack can be
detected.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Denial-of-service attack can be simply explained with the analogy of the telephone
network. A telephone number can be easily attacked by calling to that number by
a number of people simultaneously, which in turn do not give access to a legitimate
caller. A denial-of-service attack is a malignant attempt by a single person or a
group of persons to disrupt an online service. Denial-of-service attacks have caused
huge financial losses in recent years in the Internet. Denial-of-Service attacks affected
businesses on websites like eBay.com, amaon.com, yahoo.com, ZDNet.com, Buy.com
and a lot of other similar websites [1, 2].
Most of the attacks that come under a denial-of-service are bandwidth attacks.
The attackers generate a huge traffic in the network and overload the network with
unwanted or bogus Internet packets. Detection of bandwidth attack is difficult when
the detector is far from the victim. But it becomes easier when the detector is placed
near to the victim.
Recently, a lot of denial-of-service attack detection schemes have been proposed.
Most of these schemes come under volume-based scheme or feature-based scheme.
Volume-based scheme needs a detectable disruption in the traffic volume. When the
attack is done gradually, then there is a possible vulnerability in some volume based
scheme. On the other hand, feature-based scheme detects the attack by inspecting
the header information. It checks the header, and some schemes even check the
1
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data parts as well to detect any possible anomaly in the traffic. But the checking
of every single packet is time consuming and if the traffic is very high, it becomes
very difficult. Feature based-schemes are most accurate in detection, but they are
notoriously processor hungry.
This thesis focuses on another approach, which takes the positive sides of both
volumes-based approach and feature-based approach, detecting denial-of-service
attack using packet size distribution. The method only uses the entropy of the
packet size, and when there is a spike in the packet size entropy- time series, it
could be a potential denial-of-service attack. This method can be slightly improved
by adding a new parameter called eSD. When eSD time series gives a spike in the
series, we say that it could be a possible denial-of-service attack. At the same time,
the packet rate in the network should exceed the threshold value. If the packet rate
is low and there is a spike in the series is not considered as a denial-of-service attack.
1.1 Thesis Organization
In Chapter 2 we are discussing about the network attacks in general, denial-of-service
attacks in particular and the methods that are available to identify a denial-of-service
attack. Chapter 3 discusses about the motivation and objective of the thesis. A
new scheme is proposed in Chapter 4 from the lights of literature reviews. The
experiments that are conducted on the new scheme and the results are discussed in
chapter 5. In Chapter 6 we conclude the thesis.
2
Chapter 2
Overview of Network Attacks and
Detection Techniques
2.1 Network Attacks
An attack is usually perpetrated by someone with bad intentions. Generally such
people are known as black hat hackers. There are people who do attacks to find
out the flaws in the network, such an attacker actually doing penetration testing.
While there are many specific ways to launch attacks to a network, there are three
general types of attacks:
Reconnaissance Attacks
Access Attacks
Denial-of-Service Attacks
These attacks are not discrete. These attacks can be used in combination to
meet the goals of the malicious attacker
3
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2.1.1 Reconnaissance Attacks
Reconnaissance attacks [3] are used to gather information about a target network
or a system. Such an attack may seem harmless at the time and may be overlooked
by network administrators as network noise, but it is usually the information gained
through reconnaissance attack that is used in subsequent access or denial-of-service
attack.
Several means may be used to gather information about an organization and
could include automated and technological attacks as well as human social attacks.
Examples might include ICMP ping sweeps against a network or SNMP walking
technologies to gather network map and device configuration data. Likewise,
application level scanners could be used to search for vulnerabilities such as web
server CGI or ASP weakness.
No specific damage may be caused by reconnaissance attack, but it is analogous to
burglar staking out a neighborhood, watching for times of inactivity, and occasionally
testing windows and doors for access. Reconnaissance attacks are common and
should be considered as a serious threat to an organization as they may give potential
attackers the information required to perform access or denial of service attack.
2.1.2 Access Attacks
As the name implies, access attacks are those involving the unauthorized use of
a target machine or machines. The means by which an intruder gains access to
infrastructure are typically specific to the exploitable vulnerabilities present in the
operating system, application software or physical protection mechanism. Often
these vulnerabilities are discovered by hackers during reconnaissance attack.
Access attack can be manual or automated and may be composed of unstructured
or structured threats. Access attacks are categorized into data retrieval attacks,
system access and privilege escalation. The first form of access attack is the
unauthorized data retrieval in which information is read, copied or moved to a
4
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system. The data retrieval access attack is a common form of internal threats
and is largely the result of poorly configured file and directory permissions. For
instance, world readable Windows file shares or Unix NFS directories are relatively
simple ways for unauthorized users to gain access to potentially sensitive data such
as accounting or human resource information. Use of proper mounting or access
permission and even encryption could prevent such access.
System access attacks occur when an attacker has Operating system level or
actual log-in access to a device. Such illegal access could be achieved through
weak or non-existent passwords or through known exploits against operating system
vulnerabilities. Many secondary attacks could result from illegitimate system access.
For example, compromised machines could be used to target other machines. Once a
hacker obtains access to the system, he or she could attempt for privilege escalation.
Attaining higher privilege of a system allows hackers to perform far more
dangerous actions. Once an intruder has system access, they often seek super-user
or root privilege to install Trojan code or create a backdoor for future covert
access. Privilege escalation is often acquired via operating system or application
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow attacks. Once a system has been compromised
in this manner, it is completely at the control of an attacker.
2.1.3 Denial-of-Service Attacks
A third form of network attack is known as denial-of-service attack [4]. Here the
attacker seeks to prevent the legitimate use of service or system. Often times, this
is accomplished by overwhelming an infrastructure with bogus requests for service.
Denial-of-service attacks can also be caused by corrupted data or configurations.
For instance, a denial of service attack could be the result of an intentionally
corrupted BGP protocol routing configuration. If the attacker changed the network
advertisement, authentication attributes or anonymous system number (ASN)
parameters of an organization’s routing equipment, that organization could simply
disappear from the internet or worse yet, traffic destined to that organization could
5
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be routed to illegitimate remote locations on the Internet. Denial-of-service can also
be dispersed so that numerous compromised machines launch a denial-of-service
attack on the same target service or host known as a Distributed denial-of-service
attack, such events are extremely difficult to combat since it is impossible to ascertain
the difference between the legitimate and illegitimate traffic.
2.2 Overview of Denial-of-Service Attacks
2.2.1 ICMP flooding Attack or Ping to death
A Denial of Service attack that sends large amounts of ICMP packets to a victim
in order to crash the TCP/IP buffer on the victims machine and cause it to stop
responding to TCP/IP requests is called an ICMP flooding attack or Ping flooding
attack [5, 19]. Now a days servers becomes more and more powerful. So this
technique does not cause more damage to a victim nowadays. The attacker wants to
magnify the amplitude of attack by increasing a number of attacking packets. The
solution is a Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks (DDoS).
In a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) [17, 18] the attacker attacks a victim
from multiple source systems. The attacker uses a large number of compromised
machines to send bogus packets at the same time to crash a victim or Internet
connection. These packets must send in masses to break down the system. The
attacker needs is a botnet that contain a large number of compromised machines.
These machines will be waiting for the command from the attacker. One it got a
signal from the attacker, the machines will start sending requests to the server. As
a result, a large number of packets, which come from many compromised computers
could break down the victim system. The magnitude of the attack is based on the
number of compromised computers in the botnet.
6
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Figure 2.1: Smurf Attack
2.2.2 Smurf Attack
Smurf attack [6, 11] is similar to ICMP flooding attack. But the way in which it
creates a large number of ICMP request is different. Here the attacker sends a
large amount of ICMP echo to a broadcast address of the network (i.e. x.x.x.255
in class C of IPv4 type) and uses a victims IP address as the source IP address.
Since the source IP is that of the victim, the reply-message from all computers in
that network that respond to the broadcast address will flood the victim. There are
two parties affected by this attack: the spoofed address target known as the victim
and the broadcast router known as an amplifier. The victim is the target of a large
amount of traffic that the amplifiers generate. The intensity of the attack depends
on the number of hosts behind the router that reply to the ICMP echo packets.
The following are steps of SMURF attack;
1. The attacker forges the source IP address to be the victims IP address and
sends ICMP Echo Request packets.
7
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2. These ICMP Echo Request packets are sent to the broadcast address of the
router. These packets are broadcast to all computers that are connected to
the router.
3. All the machines that are alive on that network send an ICMP Echo Reply
packet back to the spoofed source IP address of the victim. The amplification
factor can be very large, as the number of machines alive in the network is
large.
2.2.3 IP Spoofing
Spoofing of IP addresses [7] is lying about ones own IP address. An application
program fills the header fields of the IP packet with any IP address it wants while
writing to a raw socket. Root permission is required to do such actions which is
always known to a user running Linux on a PC. If routing is purely based on the IP
destination address only, it wont check the Source IP address. In Reflection attacks,
attackers use one specific IP source address on all outgoing IP packets to make all
returning IP packets go to the unfortunate owner of that address. The main use of
IP spoofing is to hide the location of attacker in the network.
IP spoofing is now efficiently eliminated by Ingress/Egress filtering which is
performed by routers. The source address of the outgoing packet is matched against
a group of IP address or it checks whether the Source IP address belongs to that
particular network. It is done by Routers. And if conditions are not satisfied,
then the packet is dropped. For example, a router at NITRourkela will only route
outgoing packets that have an IP source address from subnet 192.168.1.0/22. IP
spoofing is not only a weapon to hide the identity of an attacker, it can do much
more than just that. In these days instead of spoofing IP address attackers are using
botnets [20,21] to get different IP addresses. So in that respect IP spoofing becomes
less important in such scenarios. Ingress/egress filtering mechanism makes the life
of an attacker more difficult, but it is far from being a magic bullet.
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A new scheme was devised by Stefan Savage et al [8]. Their method can
successfully trackback the packets. Their IP Traceback scheme assists in tracking
down attackers postmortem. It requires routers to probabilistically mark packets
such that the receiving end can reconstruct the route that packets followed. But
it requires a minimum number of packets to be sent from the source. But this
method is useful only to identify the source of the attack. But this method can be
integrated to other schemes so that the scheme can identify, trace back and block
the attack.
2.2.4 TCP-SYN Attacks
Normally, in a client server mode when an Internet user wants to request a
service from the server the connection is set up in three steps. The user sends
an establish-message to let the server know his/her request. The server ends an
acknowledge-message back to the user and waits for the reply-message from the user
until the connection is established or the timeout period is expired. The third step is
to open a socket port by the server and waiting for a reply-message from that user.
This state is known as server half-open state. The TCP-SYN attack technique [9]
uses this weakness of TCP/IP by sending request-message with a large amount of
data and source address from a spoofed address that does not exist.
To succeed a denial-of-service attack by using this method, the attacker launches
an uncompleted three-way handshake by sending a large amount of spurious request
messages to start a connection and waits for the server to reply acknowledge back to
the attacker. Since the address doesn’t exist, the server will not receive any messages
back from the attacker. Because the three-way handshake must complete in three
steps of exchanging messages between a server and client, for a while the server will
be waiting for a third message from the attacker. The attacker can send a large
number of bogus requests to open a connection with this method to the server and
the server will waste a lot of resources to service these bogus messages and cannot
9
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Figure 2.2: TCP-SYN Attack
serve authentic users.
2.2.5 Trinoo Attacks
Trinoo attacks [10] are more sophisticated than smurf attacks. First you need a
compromised system. Once you got a compromised system, the attacker will install
a small daemon application. This application will wait for the master’s command
and stays in the compromised system. The compromised system is called a zombie
machine. The communication between the master and the zombies is often encrypted
so as to complicate matters for network intrusion detectors. The master can instruct
all the zombies to start sending UDP packets to one destination at any point of time,
which can initiate a denial of service attack.
2.2.6 Stealth Bombs
The bandwidth attacks can be simply generated by a huge amount of normal
TCP/IP traffic. By running a JavaScript in a browser that pops up a few dozen
windows each fetching a Web page from one server means certain death for that
server if a few thousand people are willing to run this script in their browser
simultaneously [12]. Self-replicating e-mail viruses can spread such kind of scripts.
10
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Stealth bomb is different from a flash crowd. When a large number of genuine users
overloads a Web server by sending genuine requests is called a flash-crowd. A website
that shows the Football World Cup score could be an example of such kind.
2.3 Overview of Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion Detection system comes in many shapes and sizes. Some are small one rack
unit appliances that tuck neatly into a server rack while others modulus such as Cisco
ISDM, that insert directly into active network component. Some IDS are simply
software applications that run on servers or workstations. Their general purpose is
to monitor events on systems and network and notify security administrators of an
event that the sensor determines is worthy of alert. An IDS weights these situations
using a variety of means. Some IDS compare network conversations they hear to
a list of known attacks sequence or signatures. When a network traffic matches a
known exploit signature, they trigger an alert. These IDS are known as signature
based IDS. Other IDS collects a baseline of normal network operations over time.
They then continue to monitor the network for the situations that don’t match what
they have determined as normal. If this happens, they trigger an alert. These IDS
are called anomaly based IDS. Some IDS can perform automated actions beyond
simply sending alerts, such as resetting malicious connections by using a technique
called TCP Reset, blocking offending source address or shunning the IP address.
Some of the more advanced IDS can even reconfigure ACLs on routers and firewalls
automatically.
There are several types of IDS that can be deployed to aid security administrators
in their endeavors. Two types are most prevalent in modern security deployments.
They are network based intrusion detection system and host based intrusion
detection system. There are other types of intrusion detection systems which
includes file integrity checkers and log file checkers, and decoy devices known as
honeypots. Additionally there exist hybrid systems that combine some of the
11
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different functionality mentioned above.
2.3.1 Network IDS
NIDS are devices intelligently distributed within networks that passively inspect
traffic traversing the devices on which they sit. NIDS can be hardware or software
based systems and depending on the manufacture of the system, can attach to
various network media such as Ethernet, FDDI and others. Oftentimes NIDS have
two network interfaces. One is used for listening to the network conversations in
promiscuous mode and the other is used for control and reporting.
With he advent of switching, which isolates uni-cast conversations to ingress
and egress switch ports, network infrastructure vendors have devised port mirroring
techniques to replicate all network traffic to the NIDS. There are other means
of supplying traffic to the IDS such as network taps. Cisco uses Switched Port
Analyzer functionally to facilitate this capability on their devices and, in some
network equipments, includes NIDS components directly within the switch.
There are many NIDS vendors, all systems tend to function in one of the two
ways; signature based or anomaly based. Both are the mechanism that separates
benign traffic from its malicious brethren. Potential issues with NIDS includes
high speed network data overload, tuning difficulties encryption and signature
development lag time.
2.3.2 Host IDS
HIDS are systems that sit at the server end point rather than in the network transit
point like NIDS. The first type of IDS that is widely implemented is installed on
servers and is more focused on analyzing the specific OS and application functions
residing on the HIDS host. HIDS are often critical in detecting internal attacks
directed towards an organization’s server such as DNS, mail and web servers. HIDS
can detect a variety of potential attack situations such as file permission changes
12
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and improperly formed client-server request.
File integrity and log file checking agents are a form of HIDS that focuses on the
OS binary files and the log files normally produced by OS based security mechanism
such as login logs. Log file checkers run regularly as well and parse system and
application logs to search for signature based alerts. For instance, multiple failed
log in on a server would typically be detected and reported by log checkers.
2.3.3 Hybrid IDS
HIDS and NIDS are most commonly deployed forms of IDS, other types of IDS
such as hybrid IDS and honeypots can be useful tools in detecting potential
security situations. Hybrid IDS are systems that combine both HIDS and limited
NIDS functionality on the same platform. A hybrid IDS can monitor systems
and application events and verify a system’s integrity like HIDS, yet because
the monitoring of network interface runs in a non-promiscuous mode, the NIDS
functionally only serves to analyze traffic destined for the device itself. A hybrid
IDS is often deployed on an organization’s most critical servers.
2.3.4 How IDS Works ?
All IDS are monitoring tools that serve an essential service they detect potential
security events and alert administrators. Some IDS can even help perform automated
actions such as issuing an Access Control List (ACL) updates to firewalls. The IDS
should not be confused with perimeter security devices such as firewalls since they do
not directly prevent security events through blocking and authentication mechanism
themselves. NIDS are deployed where services or important traffic traverse network
devices.
All network traffic that traverse these DM2 switches is inspected by the IDS via
its monitoring interface. The NIDS could obtain data from a DM2 switch via a
13
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Cisco RSPAN port or a network tap. Alternatively, the NIDS could be an internal
component of the switch such as a Cisco IDS switch module.
Regardless should an attacker intimate a series of malicious actions against
servers on DM2 network, it might unfold in this way:
1. A hacker working from a remote workstation on the internet begins an attack
on the DM2 located target host. Perhaps the hacker is using freely available
software to scan for open Windows file shares. Since the connection between
the attacker and the target host traverse the DM2 switch, the NIDS hears the
attacker’s attempt to scan and mount unprotected Windows file shares via its
monitoring interface.
2. Since the NIDS is monitoring of the network and actively comparing all the
traffic against a predefined attack signature, it detects the attackers scanning
attempts. Depending on how NIDS is configured, several outcomes could result
at this point. He IDS could simply send an alert to the administrator via
Control and Reporting Interface. Alternatively, the NIDS could automatically
reset the attacker’s connection or add rule set for the firewall or router to deny
the attacker further access.
3. After NIDS sends an alert via its control and Reporting interface, administrators
can take actions based on security policy. This may mean manually placing
deny statements in the firewall rule set to deny the attacker or reporting the
attacker to management and the proper authentication depending upon its
severity.
Signature Based IDS
The most prevalent form of intrusion detection is through signature matching.
Referred to as signature based IDS, these systems monitor the network or server
and match packet traffic attributes against a set of pre-determined attack lists or
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signatures. Should a particular network conversation match a signature configured
on the IDS, the system alerts administrators or takes other pre-configured actions.
Signature based IDS can be quite effective in security monitoring, yet they have
several drawbacks. To detect most potential attacks, the signature database on the
IDS must be large. As the speed of the network increases,it is difficult for signature
based IDS to keep pace with network traffic. Typically the signature based IDS
must be re-tuned by removing some of the signatures from the active database
before use. While this permits the IDS to function properly, it does so at the risk
of missing potential attack. Similarly, because these IDS only alert administrators
as to potential attacks for which it has a signature, new vulnerabilities and exploits
will not be detected until the vendors or administrators develop new signatures.
IDS must be properly tuned once they are in the network environment. Because
each signature within an IDS consumes system resources, it may not be advisable to
load all signatures based on your network requirements and services. For instance,
if you don’t run a specific service or block access to the service perimeter securing
devices, it might not be necessary to monitor for potential attacks against that
service.
Anomaly Based IDS
Anomaly based IDS does not use static signatures to detect potential security events.
Rather these IDS use network traffic base line to determine a Normal state of the
network and compare current traffic to that baseline. If network anomalies occur,
the IDS alerts security administrators.
Two types of anomaly based systems exist, behavior anomaly and protocol
anomaly IDS. Both use the same type of statistical calculations to determine whether
current traffic deviates from Normal traffic, yet they specifically track different
attributes. Behavior anomaly system tends to monitor network resources using
timing, volume and similar resource characteristics while protocol anomaly IDS
typically monitors application level threats such as RFC complacency and other
15
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operational protocol content attributes.
As compared to signature based IDS, an anomaly based IDS has the potential
to detect new attack vectors as they occur. Anomaly IDS, however, can suffer from
numerous false positive as security administrators attempt to determine the dynamic
definition of Normal network operations.
2.4 Overview of Detection Techniques
2.4.1 Activity Profiling
Observing a network packet’s header information offers an activity profile. This
activity profile is the average packet rate for a network flow, which consists of
consecutive packets with similar packet fields (such as address, port,and protocol)
[13]. The elapsed time between consecutive matching packets determines the flow’s
average packet rate or activity level. Total network activity can be measured as the
sum over the average packet rates of all inbound and outbound flows.
To analyze individual flows for all possible UDP services it is required to monitor
in the order of 264 flows, and including other protocols, such as TCP, ICMP, and
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) greatly compounds the number of
possible flows. To avoid high conventionality issues, individual flows with similar
characteristics can be clustered. Each cluster’s activity level is the summation of
constituent flows.An attack is indicated by increasing activity levels among clusters,
which can indicate a few attacking agents increasing their attack-generation rate.
Attacks that use uniform address distributions will maximize the entropy statistic,
whereas one large voluminous flow will minimize the entropy. Thresholding an
entropy deviation from the expected traffic’s source address profile can suggest
anomalous activity.
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2.4.2 Sequential Change Point Detection
Change-point detection algorithms isolate a traffic statistic’s change caused by
attacks. These approaches initially filter the target traffic data by address, port,
or protocol and store the resultant flow as a time series. The time series can be
considered a time-domain representation of a cluster’s activity. If a DoS flooding
attack begins at time t,the time series will show a statistical change either around
or at a time greater than t. One class of change-point detection algorithms operates
on continuously sampled data and requires only low amounts of memory and
computational resources. An example here is cumulative sum (Cusum) algorithms.
2.4.3 Wavelet Analysis
Wavelet analysis describes an input signal in terms of spectral components. Although
Fourier analysis is more common, it provides a global frequency description and no
time localization.Wavelets provide for concurrent time and frequency description,
and can thus determine the time at which certain frequency components are present.
For detection applications, wavelets separate out time-localized anomalous signals
from background noise; the input signal contains both. Ideally, the signal and noise
components will dominate in separate spectral windows. Analyzing each spectral
windows energy determines the presence of anomalies [14].
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Motivation and Objective
The Internet consists of hundreds of millions of computers connected across the
world running on multiple hardware and software platforms. It assists in personal
and professional needs of the people and corporations. Nevertheless, attackers
use this inter-connectivity between computers to misuse resources and mount
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against arbitrary sites. A malicious user exploits
the connectivity of the Internet to sideline the services offered by a victim site,
mostly by flooding a victim with many requests. There are sophisticated attack
tools that automate the procedure of compromising hosts and launching attacks are
readily available on the Internet, and detailed instructions allow even an amateur to
use them effectively.
Denial-of-service attacks cause substantial financial impairment every year, which
makes it necessary to formulate techniques to detect and respond to attacks quickly.
Development of effective response techniques requires intimate knowledge of attack
dynamics; yet little information about attacks in the wild is published in the research
community. Moore et al [15] provides insight into the dominance of DoS activity on
the Internet, but their analysis is based on backscatter packets and lacks the level
of detail required to study attack dynamics or generate high-fidelity models needed
for DoS research. Monitoring tools today can detect an attack and identify basic
properties such as traffic rates and packet types.
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We had mainly volume based approach and feature based approach to detect the
Denial-of-Service attack. Feature based approaches work fine only with low traffic
networks. But Denial-of-Service attacks itself are heavy on traffic volume. So the
performance of this approach is a main concern. It requires a real time examination
of each and every packet passing through that network. The detection schemes
are now moving to the entropy based approaches. Entropy based approaches are
faster and easier to implement. Ping Du and Abe introduced a method to detect
Denial-of-service attack efficiently using entropy based approach. Many applications
have their typical packet size. For example, FTP has 1500 bytes data packets and 40
bytes of acknowledgment packet. Du and Abe observed this fact and proposed an IP
packet size entropy for detecting DoS attacks. The concept here was to investigate a
similarity of IP packets and uses it as a packet size entropy. By examining the time
series of packet size entropy, any changes to cause some spikes in the observed time
slot will be identified as a denial-of-service attack. This method is able to detect
both long term and short term attacks.
Abe and Du implemented their approach with an assumption that most of
the application packets will be having same packet size. That assumption is true
in most of the cases. But when we were observing the ICMP attacks it is found
that for ICMP packets, we cannot take this assumption. The packet size of ICMP
packet can be vary from 32 byte to the MTU (Maximum Transfer Unit)of the
network. So when the attacker uses this method to launch an attack, the IPSE
scheme becomes vulnerable. ICMP packets are generally used for network error
checking and troubleshooting. At the same time, this ICMP packets are weapons
of the hackers. They use ICMP packets to flood the network. ICMP packets are
also used by hackers to trace the network path and prepare network maps.
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The major purposes of this thesis are,
1. To propose a new entropy based scheme for detecting Denial-of-Service attacks.
2. To show that the new scheme is an improved version of the predecessor scheme
proposed by Abe and Du.
3. To check the working of the scheme on real time network traffic.
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Proposed Scheme
Most of the time the attacker launches a DoS attack by sending a large amount
of bogus data to interfere or disrupt the service on the server. Using a
volume-based scheme to detect such attacks would not be able to inspect short-term
denial-of-service attacks, as well as cannot distinguish between heavy load of
legitimate users and huge number of bogus messages from attackers. Enabling early
detection of Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in network traffic is an important and
challenging task because Denial-of-Service attacks have become one of the most
serious threats to the Internet. There are methods based on packet size entropy
detection. Here what we are introducing is a hybrid approach which will use address
distribution as well as packet size entropy.
Abe and Du, in their paper “Detecting DoS Attacks using Packet Size
Distribution” [16], proposed a scheme based on packet size distribution and the
packet rate. Their assumption is that when there is an attack on the network, the
entropy of the system reduces suddenly. In their approach when the traffic rate and
entropy of the packet size exceeds a threshold value, then the scheme identifies an
attack. The equation to calculate the packet size entropy of the traffic is [16,25],
Hs(t) = −
∑
l
(
nl
S
) log(
nl
S
) (4.1)
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Where nl is the number of packets having similar size l in the observation time
frame and the observation window contains S packets at time t.
Figure 4.1: Du and Abe Detection technique viewed in terms of entropy (top plot)
and volume (bottom plot)
When there is an attack on the network, the IPSE scheme shows spikes in both
the packet size entropy series and the packet rate. Since this scheme takes into
consideration only the packet size from the IP header. This scheme is very faster
since there is no other calculations or processing is required to identify the attack.
But the design flaws in the ICMP packets can be exploited by the attacker to evade
from the detection. The ICMP is a troubleshooting and error-reporting tool. The
payload of ICMP can be of any size depending on the MTU of the network, and it
can be of variable size. This exploit can be used to launch an attack on the network
using an application that using an application that generates variable size payload
in an ICMP packet and send to the victim in different packet rates. Such an attack
will be invisible to the Abe and Dus scheme.
To counter such an attack, we introduce a new parameter called eSD. This is the
entropy of source address and destination address combined. Unlike DDoS attack,
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in DoS attack the attack comes from a single source address. So the source address
of the attacker remains the same. And the address pool that the attacker can use
for a spoofed attack will be small because of the ingress/egress routing. Only the
packets that belong to the source network are routed to the network, otherwise the
packets are omitted by the router. So by taking the eSD value as a new parameter
to identify the denial-of-service attack will help in types of attacks that change the
value of the packet size.
Figure 4.2: Block Diagram of the improved detection scheme
The proposed scheme works in the same way as that of the existing scheme. The
additional component is the IP address extractor and IP distribution calculator.
From the captured packet, the detector will extract the IP header. From the IP
header, to find the packet size distribution, we will extract the length bytes and
calculate the distribution of packet length for a time frame suppose 10sec. In the
same time frame, we will extract the source and destination address from the IP
packet and make it into a hash value so that for each source destination combination,
we will get a unique value. This can be done by extracting the source and destination
IP address bytes from the packets, which will be of 32 bits each. Since both are
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stored in a sequential format, we can extract 64 bits together and convert it into a
BigInterger value. This will reduce time and processing cycle required to concatenate
and create hash values. Once the hash values are generated, we can calculate the
entropy of this address distribution. This can be calculated using the equation 4.2.
The entropy for the source destination address hash value is called eSD value.
eSD = −
N∑
i=1
(Pi) log(Pi) (4.2)
Here P is an array of normalized frequencies of hashed address bin distribution,
collected over the time window.
Pi =
ni∑
ni
, i = 1, 2, 3..... (4.3)
The existing scheme works in such a way that it checks the packet rate and
packet size entropy value together and if both values exceed a threshold value, it
detects an attack. In the proposed scheme to alarm an attack situation, we need
either Packet rate and packet size entropy or packet rate and eSD value to exceed
a threshold value. In both situation, the new scheme alarms an attack. In general,
the new parameter we introduced acts as an add-on to the existing scheme.
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Experiments and Results
The Experiment is done in two steps. The first step is to check the correctness
of the implementation. For that purpose, we have tested the new scheme with
DARPA/MIT Lincoln Laboratory data-set, which is a well known data-set for
denial-of-service attack detection testing. The second step is to prove that our
method is superior to the existing scheme and also to the check the working of
the existing scheme and new scheme in real-time environment. For real-time traffic
testing, we have checked our scheme and the existing scheme with our experiment
setup and did manual attacks using freely available tools from the Internet. The
number of attacks detected by both the methods are compared.
5.1 Checking the Correctness of Implementation
Before conducting a real-time testing using real-time traffic data and coming to
the conclusions, we need to check that our implementation is correct. For that
purpose, we have taken a well known data set, which is used for checking the
denial-of-service attack detection schemes and conducted denial-of-service detection.
The DARPA/MIT Lincoln data-set [23] contains five weeks of captured traffic, which
is filtered and prepared for DoS attack detection scheme testings. It contains normal
traffic in the week 1 and week 3, and attacks in the week 2,week 4 and week 5.
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An intrusion detection system works in two stages. One is to find the normal
traffic baseline. The second stage is to check for attacks in the ongoing traffic. To
find the normal traffic baseline, we need traffic data that do not contain any attack.
This baseline should represent the normal characteristic of the network traffic. From
the oﬄine data-set, we can take traffic details from week 1 and week 3, since these
weeks are marked as attack free. By using equations 4.1 and 4.2, we can calculate
the values of Packet Size Entropy and eSD of the network traffic when the network is
functioning normally. The time frame that we are using here is 10 sec. so that we will
get the traffic details more efficiently. In Abe and Du scheme, they observed that as
the time window is increased, the performance of the detection scheme is improved.
We also took packet rate of the network in normal traffic. These calculated values
are plotted against a time series. This series will represent the network profile in the
normal conditions.
We analyzed the network traffic of selected five days from the DARPA data-set
and plotted the time series. A portion of the time series is shown in Figure 5.1. From
the normal traffic values, we calculated the mean, median and standard deviation.
These values represent the normal characteristic of the network. The calculated
values are shown in Table 5.1. From these values, we can calculate the threshold
values for Packet size Entropy and eSD using equations 5.2 and 5.3 respectively.
The threshold value for packet rate can be calculated using equation 5.1. Calculated
threshold values are given in Table 5.2.
PacketRate = MeanPR + MedianPR + SDPR (5.1)
PacketsizeEntropy =
(MeanEN + MedianEN)− 2(SDEN)
4
(5.2)
eSD =
(MeaneSD + MedianeSD)− 2(SDeSD)
4
(5.3)
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Table 5.1: MIT Lincoln Laboratory off-line traffic analysis
DARPA/MIT Mean Median SD
Packet Rate 295 215 261
Packet Size Entropy 1.859529 1.818097 0.438062
eSD 1.612145 1.605362 0.362558
The DARPA data-set is filtered and tuned for testing of denial-of-service attacks
detection schemes. DARPA Laboratory does not want to disclose all the network
traffic details to outside world. So the data set may not behave exactly same as that
of the real traffic.
Table 5.2: Threshold values for attack detection
Data-set Packet Rate Packet size Entropy eSD
DARPA/MIT 871 0.7003755 0.6230978
The second stage we need to check the attack traffic for detecting attacks. We
have three weeks of data that contain attacks. In the Lincoln Laboratory data-set
documentation they have specifically written the locations of the attacks and the
duration of the attacks. So to check the correctness of our implementation, we need
to identify these mentioned attacks accurately. We have taken sufficient data from
the data-set. Our selected traffic sequence contains 56 individual attacks.
The same procedure for calculating the normal traffic baseline is carried out for
the attack detection as well. We checked for the attacks by checking whether the
packet rate exceeds the normal threshold value. Once the normal threshold value for
the packet rate is exceeded, we can check for the entropy values of both the packet
size entropy and eSD value. In the existing scheme, a threat is identified when there
is a spike in both the packet rate as well as the packet size entropy value. However,
in our new improved scheme, we need excess packet rate along with either packet
size entropy or the eSD value to exceed the threshold value. When either of the
entropy is exceeded the threshold value, our new scheme will alarm a threat.
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Figure 5.1: Analysis of Normal Traffic in DARPA/MIT Dataset
Our assumption is that a denial-of-service attack decreases the entropy of the
overall system immediately. From the attack traffic, using existing scheme as well
as the new improved scheme, we could detect all the 56 attack incidents that we
were monitoring. A portion of the time series that contains attacks are shown in
Figure 5.2. Our implementation of both the schemes proved to be correct. Now we
can proceed with the same implementation for real-time traffic analysis. The only
change required to change to real-time monitoring is that we have to change the
source from the oﬄine file to the NIC interface. The rest of the implementation
remains the same. So with this program we will check the real-time traffic in an
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environment that also contains attacks that are difficult to detect using Packet size
entropy alone.
Figure 5.2: Analysis of Attack Traffic in DARPA/MIT oﬄine dataset
5.2 Verification of the Improved Scheme
In the first part, we have checked the correctness of our implementation. The next
step of the experiment is to prove that our new improved scheme is superior to the
existing scheme. The oﬄine data-set do not contain an attack that is invisible to
the existing scheme and visible to the new scheme. So in the real-time environment
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we need to generate such attacks as well to prove what we are claiming is right.
We have created a setup in the hostel network to generate denial-of-service
attacks to a victim’s machine using freely available tools from the Internet. And
the IDS is installed on the victim machine. The experiment is carried out in the
same way as that of the correctness checking. First, we need to generate the normal
traffic characteristic of the network that we are monitoring. We monitored four-day
traffic in the network that is going through the victim machine. Each day two hours
of data is processed. Using these values, we generated the normal characteristics of
the network that is being monitored.
Figure 5.3: Analysis of Normal Traffic in real-time setup
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As we have done in the first stage, here also we generated a time series of packet
rate, packet size entropy and eSD values. The equations used are 4.1 and 4.2 to
find the entropy. A portion of the time series is given in Figure 5.3. The mean,
Median and Standard Deviation of these traffic data are calculated. This is the
normal behavior of the network we are monitoring. These values are shown in Table
5.3.
Table 5.3: Real-time traffic analysis
NITR Mean Median SD
Packet Rate 361 286 306
Packet Size Entropy 1.939656 1.925946 0.326357
eSD 1.787853 1.770041 0.323497
For this traffic, we calculated the threshold values to detect the attack using the
equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. These calculated threshold are given in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Threshold values for attack detection
Data-set Packet Rate Packet size Entropy eSD
Real-Time Data 953 0.803222 0.727725
Here from the real-time traffic it is observed that eSD and the Packet size
Entropy, both are different. But, in the case of oﬄine traffic analysis, both the
values remained the same.
Now it is time to analyze the new scheme in the real-time traffic. We monitored
the network for 2 hrs. and calculated the entropy in real-time. Meanwhile, we
generated a total of 7 attacks to the victim machine. Out of the seven attacks 5
of them are normal ICMP flooding attack and 2 of them were ICMP flooding with
change in payload values. Abe and Du’s scheme is expecting all the packets with
same packet size. However, the attack is a different type. So it must be invisible to
the existing Abe and Du’s scheme.
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As per our assumption, by plotting the values in the time series, it is found that
these two attacks were invisible to the Abe and Du’s scheme. At the same time, our
new parameter responded positively all to the attacks that we have carried out. So
as we have said, by using the eSD parameter, we can improve the detection accuracy
of the existing scheme. The time series is given in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Analysis of Attack Traffic in real-time data
Even though eSD values alone identified all the attacks in the experiments
we have conducted, we are not introducing the eSD parameter as a standalone
parameter. We do not believe it can exist alone to detect all the attacks. Together
with Packet size entropy eSD can identify accurately more attacks. Also Abes scheme
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uses another equation for calculating the threshold to identify the attacks, and we
are using another equation. So definitely this is a new scheme in comparison with
the Abe and Du’s scheme. And we need either Packet rate and packet size entropy
or Packet rate and eSD values to exceed the threshold value. In such a situation,
our scheme will alarm an attack situation.
Table 5.5: Comparative Analysis on Attack Detection
MIT Lincoln Real-time Traffic
Laboratory Data-set Simulation Environment
monitoring identified monitoring identified
Abe and Du’s scheme 56 56 7 5
Improved Scheme 56 56 7 7
From the analysis of both the scheme for detecting the denial-of-service attack, it
is proven that the new scheme is an improved version of the existing scheme. In our
attack simulation environment, the existing scheme detected only five attacks out
of 7. Whereas our new improved scheme detected all the 7 attacks simulated in the
experiment environment. We have checked the correctness of the implementation
by doing a correctness checking using well know denial-of-service attack data-set
containing 56 attacks.
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Conclusion
This thesis introduces an alternative technique to detect denial-of-service attack
by using packet size distribution and Address distribution. The major strength of
the new scheme over IPSE-based Denial-of-Service detection is that it can detect
denial-of-service attacks that come with altered packet size. We proved it using
real-time traffic data. We are not claiming that our method is superior to all
other methods. There are shortcoming as well in our approach. Experiments
using DARPA/MIT Lincoln Laboratory oﬄine-data set and our relatively small
data-set won’t cover all the attacks in the world. There are a lot of new attacking
methodologies introduced by the attackers nowadays. All the methods are not
available to the public due to security reasons, so it is difficult to study about the
attack schemes and prevention mechanisms. Still a lot amount of data is available for
academic purposes. Our method does not consider the distributed denial-of-service
attack. Still we can identify Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks from the packet
size distribution feature in our scheme. The main hurdle is a distributed denial of
service attack that comes with different source addresses and comes with altered
packets. Still a lot of research possibilities are available in this area.
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